Lincoln to General David Hunter - December 31, 1861
"I am constrained to say it is difficult to answer so ugly a letter in good temper. I am, as you intimate, losing much of the great confidence I placed in you, not from any act or omission of yours touching the public service, up to the time you were sent to Leavenworth, but from the flood of grumbling despatches and letters I have seen from you since."
"I have been, and am sincerely your friend; and if, as such, I dare to make a suggestion, I would say you are adopting the best possible way to ruin yourself. ``Act well your part, there all the honor lies.'' He who does something at the head of one Regiment, will eclipse him who does nothing at the head of a hundred.
Your friend as ever,
A. LINCOLN"
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Lincoln to General Joseph Hooker - January 26, 1863
"General:
I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear to me to be sufficient reasons. And yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which, I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and a skilful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm. But I think that during Gen. Burnside's command of the Army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country, and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a Dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes, can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of it's ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the Army, of criticising their Commander, and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can, to put it down. Neither you, nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army, while such a spirit prevails in it.
And now, beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy, and sleepless vigilance, go forward, and give us victories.
Yours very truly
A. LINCOLN"
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Napoleon to General Alexander of the Army of Germany - May 19, 1809
15231. - TO ALEXANDER, PRINCE OF NEUCHATEL, MAJOR GENERAL OF THE ARMY OF GERMANY, AT EBERSDORF.
Ebersdorf., May 19, 1809.
"My Cousin, strongly order the duke of Valmy not to divert anything for the Hanau corps which is intended for the army, neither troops, neither artillery, nor military crews. If he does not rigorously carried out this order, I will be obliged to relieve him of the command of this corps."
NAPOLEON.
According to the original. War depot.
Encylopedia Britannica on Alexandre Berthier
"Berthier was not a great commander. When he was in temporary command in 1809 the French army in Bavaria underwent a series of reverses. Whatever merit as a general he may have possessed was completely overshadowed by the genius of his master." To read the full article visit Project Gutenberg's Ebook of the Encylopedia Britannica
Napoleon to General Clarke - May 20, 1809
15241. - TO GENERAL CLARKE, COUNT OF HUNEBOURG, MINISTER OF THE WAR, AT PARIS.
Ebersdorf, May 20, 1809.
My dear general Clark, I received your letters of the 13th, I see that the 3rd provisional demi-brigade is only to 1,200 men and the 4th with 600 men. However all the corps which must provide to these demi-brigades have many people; thus accelerate the formation of these demi-brigades.
You were wrong to direct the detachments of dragoons to the depots of Versailles on Hanau, since there are provisional regiments of dragoons at Hanau. Continue to direct them on Strasbourg, where these regiments are formed.
I suppose that in the event of events on the side of the Scheldt you took measures to direct general Rampon there with his 6,000 national guards; that General Sainte-Suzanne , with what he has available at the camp of Boulogne, can meet in Ghent with the demi-brigades of Ghent, Maestricht and Saint-Omer; finally that you take measures in Paris for the two demi-brigades which are formed there. All that needs to be activated.
The two demi-brigades which are formed in Paris must be 5,000 men strong ; it is necessary that they are ready and in hand, to post them to any points of the coast which are threatened.
According to the minutes. Empire Archives.
For more correspondences between Napoleon and his generals, visit The War Times Journal
For a Historians perspective on Napoleon and his generals see, Napoleon as a Military Commander: The Limitations of Genius
Lincoln vs. Napoleon - on dealing with generals
Read and examine the materials below that address how Lincoln, the Commander-in-Chief during the U.S. Civil War dealt with his difficult generals differently than Napoleon, the Emperor of France who at one time acted as a general himself. Seek to answer the essential question: What different strategies did Lincoln and Napoleon use to earn the respect and obedience of their generals?
